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SUMMARY
This paper examines how policies on mobilization, personnel management, and compensation affect the decision to join the Army Reserve Components (RC) and the decision to continue in service. We derive and estimate a behavioral model of these decisions, which may be employed to predict the manpower consequences of alternative policies. The work was undertaken in the context of the unprecedented mobilization of large numbers of reservists and guardsmen that has taken place subsequent to the attacks of September 11, 2001 . This extensive mobilization has raised concerns that widespread Our results indicate that while the great majority of the population of young men is disinclined to serve in a mobilized condition, an important minority will perceive mobilizations positively. Accessions and continuation rates are sensitive to the frequency and duration of active duty. Plausible increases in expected active duty will result in relatively small reductions in continuation rates. Pay and bonuses have the capacity to reverse these losses. By contrast, accession rates will increase with reasonable increases in demand for active-duty time above current levels.
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A. INTRODUCTION
During the ten-year period between Operation Desert Shield/Storm and September 11, 2001, few military reservists were ever involuntarily called to active duty.
Even within units that were called up "involuntarily," volunteers from other units commonly replaced those members who did not wish to mobilize. This pattern changed dramatically following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . During the subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOT), hundreds of thousands of members of the Army National Guard and Reserve have been activated; 73,769 reservists were currently on active duty as of February 13, 2008 (Department of Defense, 2007a . Consequently, the extensive use of reserve forces has raised concerns that retention and/or recruiting in the Reserve Components might decline.
Recent statistical studies of the effect of deployment on the retention of Active Component members have indicated that deployment may actually increase retention (see Cook, Marcus and Quester, 1992; Hosek and Totten, 1998; Fricker, 2002) . However, these studies relied on data from the period prior to the war on terror. Future statistical studies based on data from the current wartime period may be correspondingly inapplicable to peacetime deployments. It is also unknown whether these results extend to the Reserve Components. These issues highlight the need for understanding the determinants of recruiting and retention in the Reserve Components. Sophisticated statistical models of the accession and retention decisions of Active Component soldiers have been developed and applied to data. Until now, there has not been a corresponding development of the theory of reserve participation. Dolfini-Reed, Parcell, and Gregory (2005) have presented data on the rates at which activated and never-activated reservists remain in service from year to year. These are important findings. However, a forward-looking decision to continue in service will be affected by expected future activation as well as past active duty. Comparing these reported continuation rates cannot elucidate whether expected activation alters continuation. Only a small fraction of second activations in support of the GWOT have been involuntary. The partial mobilization authority (Title 10 U.S.C 12302) requires that no reservist be activated longer than twenty-four months. Therefore, during the early years of the GWOT, the Department of Defense did not activate reservists involuntarily a second time if they have already served more than twelve months of active duty.
Consequently, reservists who had already been activated may have had an expectation that they would not be activated again under the current authority. 1 We have pursued a four-stage research program. In stage one, we formulate a mathematical model of the accession and continuation decision. The second stage is to apply this model to statistically estimate the structure of attitudes to active service among reservists and among the general population. The goal of stage three is to use the populations found in stage two to build a forecasting model that will predict changes in the strength of the Reserve Components as expectations of active duty change. Finally, stage four involves using the forecasting model to simulate the effects of alternative policies on Reserve Component strength.
If they hold these expectations, even if reservists view active duty negatively, the activated group need not have a lower continuation rate than the never-activated group. This is true because some activated reservists will stay because they do not expect more active duty, while some never-activated reservists will leave to avoid future activation. Future expectations of active duty are important in today's continuation decision. We have developed a model that accounts for these expectations. This paper reports the results of stages one and two of our research agenda. We present a model of the decision to stay in the Selected Reserve in each year (continuation). These decisions are affected by the frequency and durations of involuntary periods of active duty, the predictability of involuntary call-up, and the level of pay and bonuses. We extend the model to explain the decision to join the reserves (accession). We use statistical methods to match this model to the behavior of the true population of young males. Ultimately, this decision model will form the basis of a forecasting model. Forecasts will vary with policies on mobilization, personnel management, and compensation. The forecast model will also predict the tradeoffs between these factors.
B. A MODEL OF RESERVE SERVICE DECISIONS
Our model is an extension of the widely used "augmented Annualized Cost of Leaving" model or ACOL-2 (see Goldberg, 2001 ). In keeping with tradition, we term our model the Annualized Reserve Component Activation Cost of Leaving Model, or "ARCACOL." This is a model of the decisions to join and continue in service.
Reservists make forward-looking decisions. They compare the benefits from not joining the Selected Reserve at the current time with the benefit from joining and staying until retirement eligibility. In subsequent years, they compare the benefits from leaving the Selected Reserve in the current year with the benefit from staying until retirement eligibility. They decide in each year whether to stay or leave.
We assume that reservists understand the national security environment when they form their expectations. They know that there is always some probability of a war, and that activations will occur in wartime. Reservists do not know with certainty whether next year will be wartime or peacetime; they do not know whether they will be activated next year. However, they know the probabilities of these events. Wartime is divided into two possible levels of engagement: a heavily engaged state in which our military is involved in several wars at once (as it has been since 2003) and a state of more limited involvement. We assume that reservists expect that activation rates during the highly engaged state will be similar to those of the current Global War on Terror era.
Three factors affect reservists' decisions to join, and to stay in, the Reserve Components. Reservists value money income. They care about the amount of time that they spend on active duty, and assign a positive or negative money valuation to a day on active duty. Random events also affect reservists' decisions; for example, a spousal illness may raise the "cost" of service temporarily. These random shocks are also expressed in dollar terms; they are added to income and the valuation of active duty, giving a total measure of "utility"-the reservist's well-being. A reservist decides whether to stay or leave the Reserve Components by comparing the sums of the discounted values of utility generated by the two options. Civilian earnings will not be earned while on active duty. Permanent income effects that Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
are not measured, such as variations in civilian pay, will be captured in the value of active duty.
The relationship between active duty time and the reservists' utility (their wellbeing) has two important features. First, the relationship is non-linear: a service member who would prefer six months of active duty to no active duty might also prefer no active duty to eighteen months. Second, reservists' past history of time spent on active duty affects the decisions they make today. A reservist's valuation of active duty time for his current utility includes both the number of months on active duty this year and the number of months in prior years. The effect of active duty in prior years on current utility grows smaller as the years recede. This formulation reflects the idea that time spent away on active duty affects the quality of one's home life in durable ways. For example, a marriage may be more resilient to a one-year absence than a three-year absence.
Activation this year may be harder on a family if the reservist has also been activated in a recent year.
Finally, the key feature of the model is that the relationship between active duty and utility is different for each person. The model assumes that people's attitudes follow a statistical distribution along the axis from active duty being more beneficial to active duty being more costly. Some people may prefer no active duty, while others may prefer to have some active duty but not too much time away from home; still others may prefer to be full-time on active duty.
C. ESTIMATION
Data
We estimated the parameters of our model using data covering all service The data were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center; records were drawn from personnel files and from a data set of activations in support of the Global War on Terror, the Contingency Tracking System. Our measures of pay were derived from Census Bureau tabulations of civilian income, military pay tables and records of the Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
total bonuses paid to reservists each year. The latter was provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
Officially, recruits without prior service incur a 6-year Selected Reserve service obligation during which they are ineligible to leave. In reality, the observed rates of continuation in the first to the fifth year of service are well below 100 percent, with roughly 15 percent of the population leaving the Selected Reserve from year to year. The
Army Reserve Components do not appear to enforce the obligation to stay. Therefore, we applied no obligation in our estimations and we are modeling continuation rather than modeling retention. Retention is a term usually associated with decisions made at the end of a service obligation.
Methodology
Our model relates the probability of staying in the current year to the money cost of leaving and to expected future active duty. The expected future active duty that enters into the model depends on two "rules" that we have estimated from our data. The first rule governs the transition from peacetime to wartime and back. The second rule captures the effective policy determining reservists' history of active duty during wartime.
The first rule is demonstrated in Figure 1 , which presents the probabilities of moving between peacetime, limited wartime and heavily engaged wartime. The figure shows that during a peacetime year there is a 9.9 percent chance of moving to limited war the following year, a 21.3 percent chance of moving to heavily engaged war, and a 68.8 percent chance of remaining in peace. We estimated these probabilities from the series of wartime and peacetime years from 1973 to 2007. 3
Figure 1. Probabilities of Moving Between Peace and Wartime
The activation rule is estimated from our data on the activation histories of the reservists in our sample. The rule provides for a reservist to have activations alternating with periods of time at home (dwell times). The lengths of these activations and dwell times are chosen randomly from the distribution of these lengths in our data. This distribution is illustrated in Figure 2 . For example, 13 percent of activations were for 12 months. The rule assigns a 13 percent chance to an activation having a length of 12 desired policies in place at the time. 4
4 Our dataset does not allow us to determine whether a given activation was truly voluntary or involuntary. Our model implicitly assumes that all activations are involuntary. If, as is likely, some of the activations that we have observed in our data are voluntary, our activation rule will overstate the amount of active duty time that a reservist can expect to be required to serve. This possibility presents a major caveat to our work and may bias our results. 19.0%
Management Fields (CMF) experience different rates of activation. We allow for the rule to vary with CMF.
Figure 2. Distribution of Activation Lengths
Reservists use the two rules to make predictions of how much active duty they can expect, and they assign an equivalent money value to these amounts. They will stay if the sum of this money equivalent, the expected value of pay, and the measure of random events is positive. We statistically estimate how much each reservist values differing amounts of active duty. Our econometric model, described fully in the appendix, produces a distribution of reservists along a spectrum of low to high "tastes" for active duty. The decision to join the Guard or Reserve follows the same principle. In the joining stage, people face three choices: do not join, join the Army Guard/ Reserve, or join the active Army.
D. RESULTS
Our results allow us to analyze the continuation decision in the first year of service. We first illustrate the variation of tastes. 
Months Frequency
duty, the "high" individual has a greater taste than 75% of members and the "low"
individual has a lower taste than the higher 75%. The middle person has a good chance of continuing when faced with up to 5.5 years spent on active duty during his career, but his chances of staying decline rapidly as demands rise beyond that. The "low" member tends to drop out when expecting more than 4.5 years away. The "high" member has a strong taste for active duty. We might have expected such a person to have joined the regular Army. Our joining model allows for some other factor to have influenced him to join the reserves. The number of new accessions will also be affected by the total of lifetime active duty. Figure 5 illustrates the numbers of accessions for each level of active duty. It is important to note that true accessions will also be influenced by the Army's recruiting goals; these numbers may be thought of as the pool of potential recruits. The blue line represents the effect of active duty on accession under current benefits. Accession is maximized when the population expect about a quarter of lifetime service to be spent on active duty. We can also analyze the effects of pays and bonuses on these numbers. The Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
red line in Figure 5 plots levels of accession generated with an additional $2,000 recruiting bonus. The bonus generates about a thousand additional recruits at current levels of active duty.
Figure 5. Accessions With and Without Bonus
By definition, these results do not tell the whole story. Changes in activation rules will affect the composition of the force. When expected active duty increases, those with low taste will choose to leave or will not join. Those with high taste will stay at higher rates and will join the reserves at higher rates. Over a period of years, the resulting force will have a greater attachment to service. Our forthcoming projection model will address these issues.
E. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
We have estimated a model of reserve participation that accounts for expectations and varying tastes for active-duty service. Our model demonstrates that accessions and continuation rates are sensitive to the frequency and duration of active duty. Plausible increases in expected active duty will result in relatively small reductions in continuation 
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rates. Pay and bonuses also have the capacity to reverse these losses. By contrast, accession rates will increase with reasonable increases in demand for active-duty time above current levels. We should note that we cannot know if our estimates generalize to the prior-service population or to the other Reserve Components. In fact, we would expect that the results for these groups might differ significantly. We are currently in the process of estimating our model for an Army prior-service population.
Our research program continues with the development of an inventory projection model that accounts for the full distribution of tastes that we have estimated. This model will forecast the numbers of young men joining the Reserve Components and the numbers of these men continuing in service at each subsequent year. The model will forecast the effects of given activation rules. It will forecast the changes in strength during the transition between war and peace. Finally, the projection model will forecast the changes in strength during the transition between different activation policies.
THE ANNUALIZED RESERVE COMPONENT ACTIVATION COST OF LEAVING MODEL A. THE DETERMINANTS OF ACTIVE-DUTY TIME
The national security environment can be either "wartime" or "peacetime," and it changes from year to year. The transitions between these states follow a known Markov process, with a transition matrix W. For example, if we estimate a Markov model on the years since the American Revolution, 1 In our model, each year can be characterized as "limited wartime," "heavily engaged wartime," or "peacetime." In a limited wartime year, the reservist faces some probability of involuntary mobilization. In a time of heavily engaged war, the reservist faces a higher probability of involuntary mobilization. In a peacetime year, the reservist has no chance of involuntary active duty. We assume that people expect heavily engaged wartime mobilization rates will be similar to those of the current Global War on Terror (GWOT) era (post-9/11/2001). This includes the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In a period of lower-intensity wartime, the reservist will expect to be called up for an average of once in 6 years, without knowledge of the timing of these activations.
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We have estimated this three-state Markov process on the years of the allvolunteer force (1973 to 2007) . We consider the Gulf War and the post-9/11 years to be "heavily engaged wartime" and the years of the interventions in Grenada, Panama, Bosnia, and Kosovo to be "limited wartime." The resulting transitions are given below. The steady state years are 38.5 percent peace, 34.6 percent limited war, and 27 percent heavily engaged war. In order to compare this steady state with the one we generated from the long historical series, we liken major wars to the historic wartime state and consider minor wars to fall under the historic peacetime state. We implicitly treat minor wars as peace years in our long historic series. The resulting steady state is close to the one we generated from our long series.
During the wartime states, the lengths of a soldier's activations follow a known probability distribution. His dwell times between activations will be determined by another distribution. We assume that in the event of either heavily engaged or limited wartime, activation lengths will be distributed as they have been during the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . We estimate separate distributions for 14 Career Management Fields (CMF) and one for all CMFs taken together. In heavily engaged wartime, the dwell times will also follow recent history. In our sample period, many of the post-activation dwells were censored at the end of our time frame; that is, there had not been a subsequent activation as yet. In order to handle this issue, the distribution of dwell times was assumed to follow a normal distribution, and the parameters of this distribution were estimated by a censored data regression. The resulting distribution has a mean of 47 months and a standard deviation of 27 months. Again, we also compute the distributions separately for 14 CMFs. During limited war, dwell-times follow a distribution with the same variance but a mean of 60 months. We are thus assuming that during limited wartime, the Department of Defense can meet its goal of activating reservists once in every 6 years on average.
By combining the random process for transitioning between war and peace with random draws for first and subsequent amounts of active duty and dwell time, we produce our "activation rule." This rule reflects the current reality rather than the policy goal.
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B. THE DECISION PROCESS
Reservists' utility is determined by three factors: income, the money-equivalent will be less than the gain from the first month; alternatively, any loss in utility from a month on active duty will be greater than the loss from the prior month. If the marginal utility of active duty is declining, people will be risk-averse in active-duty time. Variation in preferences across individuals is modeled as variation in 2 α . We assume that 2 α follows a normal distribution: individual at the present time t, the expected return to staying until a future time T is given by
where β is the discount factor for the present value calculation. E t ( ) is the expectations operator, capturing the individual's forecast of the future at present time t. It follows that
.
The values of 
T is the expected date of retirement eligibility, and ε is a random variable drawn from the logistic distribution. This formulation allows the parameters of the utility function to be estimated using a mixed effects logistic regression. 2 κ We estimate the depreciation parameter by running a series of these logit models for a grid of 1 3 Due to the standardized nature of military pay, the variable ACOL had little variation beyond that which was determined by the level of expected active duty. Consequently, it functioned in the estimation more as an additional measure of active duty than a measure of pay. In order to get a clean estimate of the effect of additional pays and bonuses on continuation, we replaced ACOL with the annualized value of a payment that was relatively uncorrelated with expected active duty: anniversary payments of enlistment bonuses. As a result, the estimated coefficients on our measures of active duty incorporate the ameliorative effects of rising ACOL upon continuation as active duty rises.
A-8 Components and the parameters of the reserve population that we previously estimated, µ and σ . In order to choose the accession parameters, we conduct a stochastic search.
We take 30,000 random combinations of the accession parameters and use each combination to predict proportions joining and reserve population parameters. The combination that minimizes the squared deviations of these parameters from their known values is taken as our estimate of the accession parameters.
Our results are tabulated in Table A -3 . The values of ξ and γ are highly negative, This indicates that a large majority of the population is highly disinclined to serve in the Army. 
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This paper examines how policies on mobilization, personnel management, and compensation affect the decision to join the Army Reserve Components and the decision to continue in service. We derive and estimate a behavioral model of these decisions, which may be employed to predict the manpower consequences of alternative policies. Our results indicate that while the great majority of the population of young men is disinclined to serve in a mobilized condition, an important minority will perceive mobilizations positively. Accessions and continuation rates are sensitive to the frequency and duration of active duty. Plausible increases in expected active duty will result in relatively small reductions in continuation rates. Pay and bonuses have the capacity to reverse these losses. By contrast, accession rates will increase with reasonable increases in demand for active-duty time above current levels.
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